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Abstract 
At the EU Council in December 2004, European heads of govern-
ments decided to start EU accession negotiations with Turkey in 
October 2005. Various recent analyses assess the cost of applying 
the Common Agricultural Policy of the EU (CAP) to Turkey; most of 
them without taking into account the specific structure of the agri-
cultural sector in Turkey, which would determine the receipts from 
EU funds. This paper assesses potential budgetary effects resulting 
from the application of the CAP to Turkey. The analysis is based on 
macroeconomic projections, equilibrium modelling of the Turkish 
agricultural sector, and projections of the future development of the 
CAP. It is found that total EU budgetary outlays for the application 
of the CAP to Turkey could total about € 3.5 billion in 2015 and rise 
to € 5.4 billion in 2025 due to full phasing in of direct payments and 
rural development policies. The resulting net transfer under the CAP 
to Turkey would be about € 1.7 billion in 2015 and could increase to 
€ 2.9 billion in 2025. Such sums take a backseat to projected trans-
fers under the structural policy of the EU and the overall political 
project of including Turkey in the EU. 
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Zusammenfassung  
Im Dezember 2004 hat der Europäische Rat beschlossen, zum Okto-
ber 2005 Beitrittsverhandlungen mit der Türkei aufzunehmen. Es 
wird allerdings sowohl von europäischer wie auch von türkischer 
Seite ein langer Verhandlungszeitraum und eine EU-Vollmitglied-
schaft der Türkei nicht vor 2014 erwartet. Die Diskussion über die 
aus der Gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik der EU (GAP) resultierenden 
Budgetwirkungen eines EU-Beitritts basiert bisher meist auf Schät-
zungen, die die spezifische Struktur des türkischen Agrarsektors 
sowie zukünftige Änderungen der GAP bis zu einem Beitritt der 
Türkei kaum einbeziehen. In diesem Beitrag werden die aus der GAP 
resultierenden Budgetwirkungen eines potentiellen EU-Beitritts der 
Türkei im Jahr 2015 auf Grundlage von der Literatur entnommenen 
makroökonomischen Projektionen, Abschätzungen zukünftiger Än-
derungen der GAP sowie einem Gleichgewichtsmodell des türki-
schen Agrarsektors analysiert. Im Ergebnis ergeben sich im Rah-
men der GAP EU-Zahlungen an die Türkei von insgesamt 3,5 Mrd. € 
im Jahr 2015, die nach einer schrittweisen Einführung des vollen 
Umfangs der GAP im Jahre 2025 etwa 5.4 Mrd. € betragen. Der sich 
aus der GAP potentiell ergebende Netto-Transfer aus dem EU-
Budget an die Türkei beträgt 1,7 Mrd. € im Jahr 2015 und steigt bis 
2025 auf etwa 2,9 Mrd. € an. Im Verhältnis zu den sich voraussicht-
lich aus der europäischen Strukturpolitik ergebenden Transfers und 
dem politischen Gesamtvorhaben einer Integration der Türkei sind 
diese Summen eher gering. 
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1. Introduction 
At the EU Council in December 2004, European heads of 
governments decided to start EU accession negotiations 
with Turkey in October 2005. This decision was prepared 
by a corresponding recommendation of the EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2004a) from October 6. Nonetheless, a long 
period of accession negotiations is expected and most ob-
servers believe that accession will not take place before 
2014, which is the first year of the Financial Perspective by 
the EU which begins in 2014. In the EU, discussion of 
Turkish membership is controversial for its geopolitical 
aspects, security policies, the compatibility of political 
institutions, income divergence and potential labor mobi-
lity, and the budgetary consequences for current EU mem-
ber states which would mainly result from EU structural 
and cohesion policies. The conflict between depth and 
breadth of the European integration process often domi-
nates the discussion, and the assessment of consequences 
arising from this conflict differs widely, as do positions 
with respect to Turkish EU membership (see for example 
QUAISSER and REPPEGATHER, 2004; JÄGER and STEWART, 
2004; FLAM, 2003; and QUAISSER and WOOD, 2004). Com-
pared to these aspects, the consequences of applying the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EU to Turkey is 
not at the forefront of the discussion. Aspects of agricul-
tural market integration, budgetary consequences of apply-
ing the CAP to Turkey, and necessary adjustments of the 
CAP as well as Turkish agricultural policies in case of 
accession are, however, part of the controversial debate. 
For many products, agricultural markets between Turkey 
and the EU are already integrated to a large extent in the 
framework of mutual preferential market access regimes. 
Yet markets for some products, like cereals, beef and dairy 
products, are more highly protected in Turkey than in the 
EU. Recent simulation analyses (GRETHE, 2004a, 2004b; 
CAKMAK and KASNAKOGLU, 2002) show that Turkey 
would become a major importer of animal products in case 
of full market integration with the EU and would thus con-
tribute to less market pressure for these products for which 
the EU is a net exporter. It is only for a few selected fresh 
and processed fruit and vegetable products that Turkey is 
projected to increase its exports to the EU significantly in 
case of full market integration. 
Budgetary concerns with respect to Turkish accession are 
comprehensible, if one looks at basic indicators of the 
Turkish economy compared to the EU as presented in   
table 1. Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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Table 1 shows that Turkey is a large country in terms of 
population, and has a large agricultural sector, measured by 
production value as well as agricultural GDP. In terms of 
population size and agricultural production value Turkey is 
comparable to the 10 new member states (NMS-10). With 
regard to the role of the agricultural sector in the economy 
and of per capita income, Turkey equals Bulgaria and   
Romania in shares of agriculture in employment and GDP, 
and per capita GDP in purchasing power standard 
(GDPPPS). Compared to the EU-25, the Turkish economy is 
small; total Turkish GDP is only slightly more than 2% of 
that of the EU-25. Based on this data Turkey would become 
a significant net recipient under current EU policies be-
cause of high transfers under the EU structural and agricul-
tural policies and a low contribution to the EU budget due 
to a low GDP. Yet Turkey will not accede today, nor in the 
immediate future. Until accession, many determining fac-
tors such as macroeconomic variables and the design of the 
CAP will change. 
Even so, the public discussion on the cost of accession has 
started: a widely cited study of QUAISSER and   
REPPEGATHER (2004) estimates total EU expenditure for 
applying the current CAP to Turkey at € 4.4 to 5.4 billion. 
This estimate is based on a regression analysis applied to 
the EU-25 sample with agricultural value added and agri-
cultural production value in the individual member states as 
explanatory variables for EU budgetary outlays for full 
implementation of the CAP. Such an approach, of course, 
does not account for the specific production structure of 
Turkey, nor does it account for the variables which play a 
major role in the allocation of rural development funds, 
which are agricultural area, agricultural employment, and 
per capita income. In addition, it seems unlikely that the 
current level of direct payments to agricultural producers in 
the EU, which accounts for more than 60% of budgetary 
outlays for the CAP, will survive until the year 2013, which 
QUAISSER and REPPEGATHER take as a potential accession 
year. DERVIS et al. (2004a) estimate the cost of the CAP 
applied to Turkey in 2015 at about € 8 billion, based on the 
assumption that Turkey’s GDP at 
that time would be around €  400 
billion with a 10% share from the 
agricultural sector. Therefore, if the 
current EU-15 level of budgetary 
outlays for the CAP relative to agri-
cultural GDP of roughly 20% were 
maintained, CAP outlays for Turkey 
would be 20% of € 40 billion, i.e. € 8 
billion. This is considered an upper 
bound as no changes in the CAP until 
2015 are taken into account. FLAM 
(2003) estimates annual EU budget-
ary outlays for Turkey as an EU 
member, including structural poli-
cies, at €  17 billion and Turkey’s 
contribution to the EU budget at 
about €  5 billion. This estimate is 
based on a regression analysis for the 
EU-15 sample, which takes GDP as 
the explanatory variable for the con-
tribution to the EU budget, and eligi-
bility for the cohesion funds and 
council voting power as explanatory 
variables for receipts from the EU budget. Obviously, in 
transferring these results to the accession candidates at that 
time, no budgetary limits are taken into account; total net 
transfers to the then 13 accession candidates are estimated 
at about € 50 billion annually (FLAM, 2003: 45). Further-
more, changes in EU policies since the base period for 
estimation (1999/2000) are not taken into consideration. 
None of these recent analyses is based on the specific struc-
ture of the agricultural sector in Turkey, which would de-
termine the receipts from the EU budget. 
Some sector specific analyses were carried out after Tur-
key’s application for full membership in 1987 (MANEGOLD, 
1988; AKDER et al., 1990). But the CAP has changed a 
great deal since the end of the 1980s making these assess-
ments of limited validity today. A predecessor of this article 
in September (GRETHE, 2004c), a report of the EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION (2004c) in October, and a report prepared by 
OSKAM et al. (2004) as a background paper for the Dutch 
EU Presidency and published in December 2004 are recent 
analyses which are based on specific features of the agricul-
tural sector in Turkey. 
The aim of this article is twofold; first, to explore potential 
ways of determining budgetary outlays resulting from ap-
plying the CAP to Turkey and second, to determine the 
order of magnitude of effects on the EU budget resulting 
from the application of the CAP to Turkey under different 
assumptions. The determination of the magnitude of pay-
ments, although arbitrary in a situation of at least 10 years 
until accession, is considered relevant for two reasons. 
First, to see whether EU budgetary outlays for applying the 
CAP to Turkey are so high that they put the process of 
Turkish accession in question, as is sometimes maintained. 
Second, to look at long-term reform pressure on the CAP 
which may result from the accession of Turkey to the EU.  
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the 
challenge of assessing budgetary effects resulting from the 
CAP in case of accession and an analytical framework to do 
so. In section  3, the amount of direct payments which 
would result for Turkey from the current CAP as well as 
Table 1.   Basic economic indicators in Turkey and the EU-25 
 EU-25  NMS-10  Bulgaria & 
Romania 










(2003, bill. €)b 
9 738.9  437.1  68.1 212.3 2.2%
GDPPPS per capita  
(2003, €/year)
b 
23 270  11 302  6 331 5 750 24.7%
GDP of the agr. sector  
(2003, bill. €) 
194.8 15.7  7.8 23.6 16.1%
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a FAO (2004), 
b EUROSTAT (2004), 
c SIS (2004a), 
d EUROPEAN C OMMISSION 
(2004b), 
e SIS (2003), 
f SIS (2004b), 
g EUROPEAN C OMMISSION (2004c), own 
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under further reform scenarios is estimated for the years 
2015 and 2025. In section 4, potential payments from the 
EU budget to Turkey under the so-called second pillar of 
the CAP are examined, including a heterogeneous collec-
tion of rural development policies. Finally, section 5 sum-
marizes and complements findings, presents potential net 
effects on the EU budget, and draws some conclusions. 
2.  Analytical approach of assessing  
budgetary implications of applying  
the CAP to Turkey 
In the event of accession, Turkey would not only be subject 
to the market price level resulting from various market 
policies under the CAP, but to the CAP itself which is 
mainly financed by the EU budget. Main budgetary items 
are the direct payments to producers under the first pillar of 
the CAP, and payments under the second pillar of the CAP, 
including various types of rural development measures, e.g. 
payments under environmental programs and investment 
subsidies. 
Due to the long period expected before accession, the time 
component is extremely important when analysing the ef-
fects of applying the CAP to Turkey. Four areas of interest 
play a major role, not least, the state of the CAP itself. 
Many reforms of the CAP yet to be implemented are   
already determined, including partial decoupling of direct 
payments under the Mid-Term Reform. Others can be 
guessed at on the basis of specific reform proposals, such as 
price reductions and direct payments foreseen for the sugar 
market regime. Still, for 2015 it seems arbitrary to formu-
late one “future CAP”. Rather the analysis needs to frame a 
set of scenarios of how the CAP could look like in 2015, 
and which components and to what degree would be im-
plemented in Turkey in case of accession.  
The second important area of interest in determining the 
budgetary cost and net transfers to Turkey resulting from 
the CAP is the state of the Turkish agricultural sector at the 
time of accession. As a result of changes in world market 
prices, technological progress, increasing incomes and 
population, and many other factors, the Turkish agricultural 
sector will be different in 2015. In addition, accession itself 
will affect the allocation of resources in Turkish agriculture.  
A third determining factor for net transfers to Turkey is 
Turkey’s contribution to the EU budget in case of acces-
sion. As the contribution of member states to the EU budget 
is mainly determined by the size of their GDP, shares in 
GDP are a good indicator for shares in the EU budget. But 
Turkey’s share in the total GDP of a potential EU-29 in 
2014 may be very different from that today, as economic 
growth in the EU-25 (-28) up to 2015 may be different from 
that in Turkey. 
And finally, the conditions of Turkish accession to be nego-
tiated between the EU and Turkey will significantly deter-
mine budgetary flows. For example any transition periods 
for fully applying direct payments, the level of payments 
under the second pillar of the CAP, and the size of quotas 
for any quota products are all negotiable factors. Also the 
basic method of determining direct payments for Turkey 
may differ from that applied to the NMS-10 and Bulgaria 
and Romania. Whether negotiations about direct payments 
for Turkey in about 5 years or more will still be based on 
base yields, areas and animal stocks, is an open question. 
The implementation of the Simplified Area Payments 
Scheme (SAPS) for 8 out of 10 of the new member states 
has set precedents for uniform per ha premiums. Fixing 
direct payments per ha based on the level in comparable 
countries and political negotiating power may therefore be 
an alternative for Turkey. 
Based on these considerations, the following approach   
is applied for determining budgetary flows between the   
EU-27 and Turkey which would result from applying the 
CAP in case of accession. 
• Turkey’s contribution to the EU budget is calculated 
based on projected GDP from macroeconomic growth 
scenarios taken from the literature. LEJOUR et al. (2004) 
project real GDP growth for Turkey until accession at 
5.6%. DERVIS et al. (2004b) project Turkish per capita 
GDP expressed in foreign currency to grow by 6% until 
accession, which is equivalent to about 7.2% total GDP 
growth due to population growth. This assumption is 
qualified by a demographic transition leading to a high 
share of economically active population, increased   
foreign direct investment due to the political and eco-
nomic anchor provided by the start of accession negotia-
tions, and a yearly appreciation of the real exchange rate 
by 1%. QUAISSER and REPPEGATHER (2004) use a yearly 
growth rate of 5% for Turkish GDP, which they find op-
timistic. All authors project the GDP growth rate for the 
EU-25 around 2%. For the calculation of Turkey’s contri-
bution to the EU budget in this study, Turkey’s growth 
rate of total GDP in € is assumed at 5.5% (4.4% per cap-
ita; 4.5% of total GDPPPS) which is slightly above the av-
erage GDP growth rate of the last four decades (DERVIS et 
al., 2004b). For the EU-27 a GDP growth rate of 2.1% is 
assumed. A crucial parameter for the projection of future 
Turkish GDP in € is the development of the exchange 
rate. Mainly due to the dual structure of the Turkish econ-
omy, GDP in purchasing power standards is currently 
about twice as high as GDP valued in € at the market ex-
change rate. OSKAM et al. (2004: 189) assume that this 
GAP will close by 20% until 2015 which is equivalent to 
an appreciation of the exchange rate by more than 1.5% 
annually. In order to account for the significant tentative-
ness of assumptions on future growth rates of Turkish 
GDP in €, a sensitivity analysis is carried out which as-
sumes Turkish annual GDP growth being 1.5 percentage 
points lower and 1.5 percentage points higher than under 
the 5.5% base assumption. 
• The level of direct payments is determined based on two 
alternative approaches. First, product-specific EU rates 
for cereals; oilseeds and protein crops; tobacco; olive oil; 
cotton; milk; beef, sheep, and goat meat are applied to 
Turkish areas, yield and production quantities from a par-
tial equilibrium model (TURKSIM) analysis of full inte-
gration of Turkish and EU agricultural markets.
1 These 
results already include all market effects due to full mar-
ket integration, but do not include any reactions of the 
Turkish producers to the CAP, except to those resulting 
from price changes. This may be acceptable, as the most 
                                                           
1   For a comprehensive description of TURKSIM and discussion 
of results see GRETHE (2004a, 2004b). Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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important element of the CAP other than price policies is 
direct payments to producers, which will largely be de-
coupled from production in the future. For payments not 
fully decoupled, the usual EU approach is to limit pay-
ments to reference quantities at a recent level, which also 
does not allow for strong production effects. Another im-
preciseness of the current TURKSIM analysis results 
from the fact that projections are for the year 2006 and 
not for 2015. This might slightly underestimate direct 
payments for Turkey due to a somewhat lower reference 
yield. As a second approach to determine the level of po-
tential direct payments for Turkey, total agricultural area 
of Turkey is multiplied by a per ha rate for comparable 
countries under the SAPS. 
• Budgetary outlays for rural development measures for 
Turkey under the second pillar of the CAP are determined 
based on the precedents of the NMS-10 as well as Bul-
garia and Romania. Together with direct payments, these 
policies accounted for 84% of the agricultural budget in 
2002, excluding export subsidies.
2 In order not to under-
estimate the real budgetary cost, the remaining 16% are 
added as a lump sum for Turkey in order to account for 
policies not explicitly covered by this analysis: mainly 
market policies and direct payments for other products.
3 
• In a first step, the assessment of total budgetary costs of 
applying the CAP to Turkey as well as the resulting net 
transfers is based on the full implementation of current 
agricultural policies including those reform steps already 
decided. It will be argued that this approach substantially 
overestimates budgetary outlays due to expected future 
reforms. Thus in a second step, alternative assumptions 
are made with respect to CAP reforms until 2015 and the 
speed at which the CAP will be phased in. 
3. Direct payments 
In 2004, the EU spent more than €  30 billion on direct 
payments to agricultural producers, more than 60% of its 
agricultural budget. As outlined above, direct payments for 
Turkey are estimated based on Turkish product-specific 
area, yield and production as well as based on total agricul-
tural area only. For the first approach, table 2 shows the 
budgetary cost resulting from applying direct payments for 
selected products under the CAP to Turkish agricultural 
production in 2015 and 2025 under various reform and 
phasing in scenarios. Under all scenarios direct payments 
for milk are fully implemented, modulation of 5% is fully 
implemented, and direct payments for sugar are not yet 
                                                           
2   Export subsidies are excluded as they will probably be abolis-
hed, or at least substantially reduced in 2014. 
3   This is, of course, a very rough approach. For some of the 
policies which fall into this category, Turkey would get rela-
tively less than current EU members, e.g. for pork market 
policies; for other policies Turkey would receive more, e.g. 
processing aids for paste tomatoes. Furthermore, 16% is a 
relative measure within the total agricultural budget. If the 
value of direct payments is assumed to decline in real terms by 
1.5% annually, as it is in the calculations below, this implies 
an absolute decline in the amount reserved for “other poli-
cies”. This may be true for some policies, but not for others. In 
short, this 16% is more a reminder of “some substantial 
amount”, than a well-founded projection. 
included. Furthermore, all direct payments are expressed in 
2004 real € and inflation between 2004 and 2015 is esti-
mated at 1.5% annually. Therefore, direct payments decline 
in real terms over time, even under the assumption that they 
are kept constant in nominal terms. Scenarios are differenti-
ated in three dimensions. First, those that assume constant 
direct payments in nominal terms in contrast to those which 
assume a reduction in nominal payments. Second, those 
that apply in the first year of accession (2015) and those 
that apply 10 years after accession. And third, the 2015 
scenarios are differentiated with respect to whether direct 
payments are granted fully from the first year of accession 
on, or if they are phased in as for the NMS-10. 
Table 2 shows that budgetary outlays for fully applying 
direct payments to Turkey in 2015 for the most important 
products would total to about €  5.3 billion. The largest 
blocks of outlays are for cereals and oilseeds as well   
as cotton, which together account for €  2.9 billion. But   
the calculation of such numbers ignores the fact that   
Turkish producers are very unlikely to ever get direct   
income transfers of such size from the EU budget. This   
is due to the high cost of such payments to the EU budget 
which will potentially lead to further reform of the direct 
payment system before Turkish accession. Consider that   
the full phasing in of direct payments for the NMS-10   
and future direct payments for Bulgaria and Romania will 
be costly to the EU-15 (WEISE et al., 2002). Furthermore 
the level of direct payments will conflict with the budget 
ceiling in the first pillar of the CAP which was set by   
the European Council in October 2002. The “financial   
discipline” mechanism is therefore likely to result in sig-
nificant reductions of direct payments from 2007 on 
(AGRAINFORMA, 2004). An additional reason for the low 
probability of Turkish producers receiving direct payments 
at their current level is the most recent reform, which will 
fully decouple most direct payments from agricultural   
production in the future. Therefore, the need to establish 
payments at a comparable level in a common market for 
reasons of competition will become much less important.  
A trend towards nationalization of direct payments may   
be the result, already partially realized through the different 
level of direct payments in the EU-15 and the NMS-10 until 
2013, and the possibility that individual countries in   
the NMS-10 pay national top-ups to their producers in   
addition to the EU direct payments. In short, direct pay-
ments will be reduced, probably fully decoupled, and   
possibly partly nationalized before Turkey will become   
an EU member. Thus, any direct payments from the EU 
budget to Turkish producers will be much lower than   
payments under the current CAP. Therefore, the “Reduction 
of DP” scenario depicts a situation in which the nominal 
level of direct payments in the EU is reduced by an annual 
rate of 3% up to 2015. Under this scenario, budgetary   
outlays for full implementation of direct payments in   
Turkey drop to € 3.8 billion. 
Furthermore, the European Commission has already men-
tioned phasing in direct payments for Turkey (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2004d) as for the NMS-10 and as scheduled 
for Bulgaria and Romania. For those countries, the starting 
level is 25% of the EU level and the full level is reached in 
the tenth year of membership. Such an approach would 
reduce direct payments for Turkey in the initial year of 
membership to about €  1.3 billion with no reduction of Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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direct payments and € 0.9 billion under the “Reduction of 
DP” scenario. Although consistent with the approach ap-
plied to the Central European Countries, a phasing in of 
direct payments seems less than convincing for Turkey for 
two reasons. First, in contrast to the Central European 
Countries the Turkish price level for agricultural products 
would decline significantly on average due to market inte-
gration with the EU (GRETHE, 2004a). Second, Turkey 
currently applies a system of direct payments at a level of 
€ 1.3 billion annually (OECD, 2004), which is above the 
projected level for the “Reduction of DP” scenario with the 
phasing in option. 
In 2025, any phasing in period would be finalized and total 
outlays for direct payments would be at € 4.5 billion under 
the current level of direct payments and about € 2.4 billion 
under the “Reduction of DP” scenario. 
The result of € 4.5 billion for full implementation of direct 
payments in 2025 contrasts considerably with that from the 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004d: 47), which estimates di-
rect payments for Turkey in 2025 at € 5.3 billion (2004 €). 
Unfortunately, no background material on how Commis-
sion figures are generated is published. OSKAM et al. (2004: 
209) estimate budgetary outlays for direct payments in 
Turkey in 2015 at € 3.4 billion (2004 €). The underlying 
scenario includes an annual nominal reduction of direct 
payments by 2% and some additional product-specific re-
ductions. Therefore, it can be best compared to the “Reduc-
tion of DP” scenario for 2015 in this article, which assumes 
an annual reduction by 3% but no additional product-
specific reforms, with an estimate of € 3.8 billion. Although 
the total results are quite similar, some significant devia-
tions exist in both directions. The strongest difference is for 
cotton: OSKAM et al. (2004: 209) report an estimate of 
€ 372 million of direct payments in 2015 (2004 €), which 
compares to €  970 billion under the “Reduction of DP” 
scenario in this article (table 2). The main difference results 
from the area assumed eligible for cotton premium. OSKAM 
et al. report 543  000 ha whereas the TURKSIM result, 
which is based also on projected increases in irrigated area 
in the southeast of Turkey mainly planted in cotton   
(GRETHE, 2004a: 183-185), is 895 000 ha. 
As a second alternative approach, direct payments for   
Turkey could be fixed at the level of direct payments   
per ha in other member states. Payments under the   
SAPS for the 10 new member states vary between 83 €/ha  
for Latvia and about 280 €/ha for Hungary and Cyprus 
when fully phased in (AGRAEUROPE, 2004b). Taking   
into account the extensive nature of agriculture in   
large parts of the country, and the potentially lower   
political negotiating leverage of Turkey, Turkey may end 
up at the lower end, say 80 €/ha. Under such a scenario 
direct payments for Turkey would amount to € 2.8 to € 3.2 
billion, depending on which parts of agricultural land   
would be considered eligible. This question may be contro-
versial, as large parts of rangeland consist of common   
pasture areas not assigned to single producers, but inten-
sively used for grazing: who should get payments for   
this land? 
Table 2.   Budgetary outlays for direct payments (DP) for selected products in Turkey under different reform 
and phasing in assumptions (in 2004 €)  
Budgetary outlays (mill. 2004 €) 
Current DP  Reduction of DP 
  







25%  2025  2015  
full 
2015 
25%  2025 
Cereals & oilseeds in TURKSIM            
  Eligible quantity (1 000 t)  31 156  50.68  1 579  395  1 358  1 130  282  716 
  2006 area (1 000 ha)  13 684                   
  Base yield (t/ha)  2.3                   
Cereals & oilseeds not in TURKSIM                     
  Eligible quantity (1 000 t)  842  50.68  43  11  37  31  8  19 
  2002 area (1 000 ha)                      
Protein crops in TURKSIM                     
  Eligible quantity (1 000 t)  3 029  58.33  177  44  152  126  32  80 
  2006 area (1 000 ha)                      
Durum  2006 area (1 000 ha)  1 927  111.74  215  54  185  154  38  98 
Tobacco  2006 (1 000 t)  237  2 339.46  556  139  478  397  99  252 
Olive oil  2006 (1 000 t)  136  1 063.94  145  36  125  104  26  66 
Hazelnuts  2006 area (1 000 ha)  987  97.14  96  24  82  69  17  43 
Cotton  2006 (1 000 t)  3 248  417.53  1 356  339  1,166  970  243  615 
Milk  2006 (1 000 t)  10 596  28.56  303  76  260  216  54  137 
Beef  2006 (1 000 t)  353  953.41  336  84  289  240  60  152 
Sheep meat  2006 (1 000 t)  333  1  351.55 450 113 387 322  81 204 
Total outlays for direct payments:      5 274  1 318  4 534  3 772  943  2 392 
a Assumptions include: direct payments for milk fully implemented, modulation of 5% fully implemented, beef premiums/ton 50% 
above EU level as most payments are made per animal and Turkey has a higher number of animals/ton of meat produced, direct 
payments for sugar not yet included, direct payments fixed in nominal values, inflation between 2004 and 2015 1.5% annually. 
Sources: AGRAEUROPE (2004a), SIS (2003), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003a), GRETHE (2004a), own calculations Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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4. Second pillar of the CAP 
In contrast to the instrument of direct payments from the 
EU budget, which will probably decline in importance in 
the future, the second pillar of the CAP is projected to rise: 
in 2004 about € 8.3 billion, or 18% of the expenditure on 
EU agricultural policies, were spent on this broad policy 
basket of rural development policies, and in its draft Finan-
cial Perspective for 2007 to 2013, the EU Commission 
proposes to increase these payments to €  13.2 billion or 
23% of the CAP bud-
get in 2013 (AGRA 
EUROPE, 2004c). 
Through the modula-
tion mechanism, which shifts 5% of direct payments to the 
second pillar of the CAP until 2007, there is a direct link 
between the reduction of direct payments in the first pillar 
and the strengthening of the second pillar of the CAP. Cur-
rent EU payments in the second pillar of the CAP are dis-
tributed among member states according to historical nego-
tiating power and their readiness to cofinance EU funds. 
But for the allocation of modulation funds, which is “new 
second pillar money”, the EU has explicitly established 
agricultural area, employment in agriculture, and GDPPPS 
per capita as criteria for the allocation of funds.
4 The same 
criteria were used by the European Commission, along with 
the somewhat nebulous “…specific territorial situation in 
each country” (EUROPEAN C OMMISSION, 2002: 5) for the 
allocation of SAPARD funds to the Central European ac-
cession candidates, and in 
the allocation of rural de-
velopment funds for the 
NMS-10 as well as Bulgaria 
and Romania. Based on 
these criteria Turkey would 
be eligible for a high share 
of payments under the 
second pillar of the CAP. 
What could the future level 
of payments to Turkey be 
under the second pillar of 
the CAP? The answer to 
this question can only be 
guessed at as there is no 
clearly defined rule of allo-
cating second pillar funds 
to individual member states, 
whether one of the EU-15 
or a new member state. 
Therefore, the following 
“best guess” is based on the 
level of rural development 
funds being allocated to the NMS-10 for the period 2004-
2006 and to Bulgaria and Romania for the period 2007-
2009, as well as on the above-mentioned criteria of agricul-
tural area, employment, and GDPPPS per capita. Table 3 
presents a comparison of those criteria for the NMS-10, 
Romania and Bulgaria, and Turkey in 2002, as well as 
projections for all countries for the (assumed) year of   
accession. 
                                                           
4    EC Directive 1782/2003, Official Journal of the EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES (OJ) L 270, 21.10.2003. 
Table 3 shows that Turkey’s agricultural sector is expected 
to be slightly larger in 2015 than that of theNMS-10, and 
considerably larger than that of Bulgaria and Romania at 
the time of accession in terms of area and employment. The 
GDPPPS per capita, however, is projected to be 26% lower 
than that of the NMS-10 and about 14% above that of 
Bulgaria and Romania at the time of accession. The follow-
ing formula has been chosen to determine the level of rural 
payments for Turkey relative to any reference country 
group based on the criteria given above:
5 
with “reference” standing for the NMS-10 or Bulgaria and 
Romania, or any average one wishes to apply. 
The resulting factor of rural development payments for 
Turkey compared to the NMS-10 (FactorTurkey/NMS 10) is 
1.33. Rural development funds allocated to the NMS-10 
from the Guarantee section of the EAGGF are € 5.8 billion 
for the period 2004 to 2006 (EUROPEAN C OMMISSION, 
2003b), i.e. about €  1.9 billion per year.
6 Thus, Turkey 
would receive about €  2.5 billion of rural development 
funds in case of accession from the CAP budget if one takes 
the NMS-10 as a reference. Taking Bulgaria and Romania 
as a reference, the resulting factor is 1.63. Rural develop-
ment funds foreseen for Bulgaria and Romania for the pe-
riod 2007-2009 are €  1 billion annually (AGRA, 2004). 
Thus, Turkey would receive only about € 1.5 billion (2004 €) 
                                                           
5   The higher weight of area than employment has been observed 
for example in the allocation of SAPARD funds to Bulgaria 
and Romania. But as has been mentioned above: any such 
formula is arbitrary and only a rough anticipation of what 
could happen in the future. Nonetheless, the results obtained 
are surprisingly close to the numbers put forward by the   
European Commission (see below). 
6    Rural development measures financed from the guidance 
section of the EAGGF, which are much lower, are not inclu-
ded here.  
Table 3.   Criteria for the allocation of rural development funds to the NMS-10, 
Bulgaria and Romania, and Turkey 
NMS-10  Bulgaria & 
Romania 
Turkey  Turkey (2015)




(2004)  (2002, 
2003) 
(2007)  (2002, 
2003) 
(2015)  NMS-10 
(2004) 
B & R 
(2007) 
Agricultural area  
(1 000 ha) 
36 139  36 139   20 144  20 144   38 883   38 883    108% 193%
Agricultural  
employment (1 000)
3 880  3 610
 a 3 982 3 325
 a 7 458   4 667
 a  129% 140%
GDPPPS per capita 
(2003 €) 
11 302  11 641
b 6 331 7 550
 b 5 750   8 588
 b  74% 114%
a Agricultural employment in Turkey is assumed to continue to decrease by an annual rate of 3.4% 
until 2015, as it did in 1996 to 2002. For the NMS-10, Bulgaria, and Romania the same annual rate 
is applied.
 
b GDPPPS per head is assumed to grow in real terms by 3% annually between 2003 and 2004 in the 
NMS-10. For Bulgaria and Romania the growth rate is assumed at 4.5% annually from 2003 to 
2007. Projections are from EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004c). In Turkey, GDPPPS per capita is assu-
med to grow in real terms by an annual rate of 3.4% between 2003 and 2015 based on sources cited 
above.
 
Sources: SIS (2003, 2004b), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004b, 2004c), FAO (2004), own calculations
(1) 
2 / ) ratio GDP 1 (
) ratio employment 35 . 0 ( ) ratio area 65 . 0 (
Factor
reference / Turkey PPS
reference / Turkey reference / Turkey
reference / Turkey +
• + •
=Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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of rural development funds in the first years of membership 
from the CAP budget if one takes Bulgaria and Romania as 
a reference. For Bulgaria and Romania, in contrast to the 
NMS-10, rural development measures are phased in. In 
2009 the level will be at € 1.27 billion and it is understood 
that this amount will increase to about € 1.4 billion in later 
years.
7 If one takes this as a reference, the final level of 
rural development funds from the guarantee section of the 
EAGGF for Turkey may be about €  2 billion (2004 €), 
which is very close to the figures recently put forward by 
the EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004d). 
To no surprise, equation (1) can not fully explain the alloca-
tion of rural development funds to new member states. Still, 
final results derived from the NMS-10 are rather similar to 
those derived from Bulgaria and Romania. Two reasons 
lead to the assumption that in accession negotiations   
Turkey would probably end up closer to the allocation of 
funds based on the results for Bulgaria and Romania. First, 
the Turkish agricultural sector is more similar to that of 
Bulgaria and Romania in terms of its role in the overall 
economy. Second, Turkey’s political “leverage” in acces-
sion negotiations may be less than that of the first wave of 
Central European accession countries. On the other hand, 
the decline in direct payments projected above may go 
along with a higher allocation of funds to the second pillar 
                                                           
7   This phasing in process and its determinants as well as the 
method to determine final levels are rather nontransparent and 
not made public by the European Commission. 
of the CAP, which may also enhance rural develop-
ment funds for newly acceding members. 
5. Conclusions 
The above analysis shows that fully applying an un-
changed CAP to Turkey in 2015 would mean high 
outlays for the EU budget. However, the full imple-
mentation of direct payments at the current EU level 
does not seem to be realistic. Therefore, the following 
summary draws on the level of direct payments de-
rived above (table 2) under the "Reduction of DP" 
scenario, which assumes a moderate annual reduction 
of direct payments by 3% in real terms over the pro-
jection period. The derived order of magnitude of 
direct payments under this scenario is close to the 
level which would result from applying the per ha 
SAPS rate of Latvia to Turkish agricultural area. 
Table 4 summarizes various budgetary positions 
under the CAP and complements them with projec-
tions of other budgetary outlays which would result 
from Turkish membership. In addition, projected 
contributions of Turkey to the EU budget as well as 
the resulting net transfers are reported. 
Table 4 shows that the implementation of the CAP in 
Turkey without any phasing in of direct payments 
would result in EU budgetary outlays of about € 6.3 
billion. More than half of this amount would be for 
direct payments. About 24% would be for the second 
pillar of the CAP based on the EU budgetary outlays 
for rural development policies in the first years of 
membership for Bulgaria and Romania as presented 
above. The category “other policies” is set at 16% of 
the total agricultural budget as justified above, or € 1 bil-
lion. This is much higher than figures published by the 
EUROPEAN  COMMISSION  (2004d) which projects €  660 
million of market expenditures, and OSKAM et al. (2004) 
who project € 180 million of market expenditures. In the 
case of a phasing in of direct payments as applied for the 
NMS-10, direct payments would be much lower in 2015 
and the total budgetary outlays for the CAP in Turkey 
would be only €  3.5 billion. In 2025, the level of direct 
payments is projected at € 2.4 billion which is below the 
full level in 2015 because of the projected annual decrease 
of 3% in nominal and 4.5% in real terms. The budget for 
rural development measures, however, increases to €  2 
billion because of the full phasing in described above. Total  
outlays for the CAP in Turkey in 2025 are projected at   
€ 5.4 billion. 
But Turkey would not only receive part of the EU budget 
for the CAP, but also contribute to this budget. Turkey’s 
projected contribution to the EU budget as a whole under 
the three growth scenarios specified above is presented in 
the middle part of table 4. In order to calculate Turkey’s 
contribution to the EU budget, Turkey’s share in projected 
EU-28 GDP is multiplied by the projected EU budget at 
that time.
8 Turkey’s contribution varies between € 4.3 bil-
lion in 2015 under the slow growth scenario and € 11 bil-
lion under the catch-up growth scenario in 2025. 
                                                           
8   The 2013 budget from the financial perspective 2007-2013 is 
used and projected outlays for Turkey are added. 
Table 4.   Total EU budgetary outlays and revenues  
resulting from Turkey's EU membership  
(“Reduction of DP” scenario) 
  Budgetary outlays and 
revenues (bill. 2004 €) 
 2015  2025 
 Full  25% 
of DP 
 
Budgetary outlays       
CAP      
Direct payments  3.8 0.9  2.4 
Second pillar  1.5 1.5  2.0 
Other policies  1.0 1.0  1.0 
Total CAP  6.3  3.5  5.4 
Structural policy  7.7  7.7  up to 25.6 
Other outlays  1.6 1.6  1.6 
Total outlays  15.6  12.7  up to 32.6 
Turkey's contribution to the budget      
Base assumption  5.2  5.1  7.8 
Catch-up growth  6.1  6.0  11.0 
Slow growth  4.4  4.3  5.5 
Net transfer to Turkey        
Total (base growth assumption)  10.4  7.6  up to 24.8 
of which resulting from CAP  4.5 1.7  2.9 
Total (catch-up growth)  9.3  6.5  up to 31.4 
of which resulting from CAP  4.0 1.3  1.9 
Total (slow growth)  11.3  8.6  up to 19.6 
of which resulting from CAP  4.9 2.1  3.8 
Sources:  data from tables 1 to 3 above, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2004e), 
OSKAM et al. (2004), own calculations Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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By combining Turkey’s contributions and receipts, net 
transfers can be calculated. First, only the net transfers 
resulting from the CAP are looked at, which are presented 
together with total net transfers in the lower part of table 4. 
They are calculated as the outlays for the CAP in Turkey 
minus the relative share of Turkey in the total EU budget 
multiplied by the size of the projected EU-28 agricultural 
budget in the respective year (again, the 2013 budget from 
the financial perspective 2007-2013 is taken for that pur-
pose and additional projected outlays for the CAP in   
Turkey are added). For example, the EU budget for the 
CAP without Turkey in 2015 is projected at € 55.5 billion 
and the budgetary outlays under the CAP for Turkey are 
estimated at €  3.5 billion with phasing in of direct pay-
ments. As Turkey has a projected GDP share in 2015 of 
3%, Turkey would contribute about € 1.8 billion to the EU 
CAP budget under the base growth scenario. As a result, 
the net transfer under the CAP to Turkey would be about 
€ 1.7 billion in 2015. Total net transfers resulting from the 
CAP for Turkey vary between € 1.3 billion in 2015 in case 
of a phasing in of direct payments and a catch-up growth 
scenario, and € 4.9 billion in case of full implementation of 
direct payments in 2015 and a slow growth scenario. In 
2025, net transfers to Turkey resulting from the CAP vary 
between € 1.9 and € 3.8 billion according to the respective 
growth scenario. Are these figures high? In closing these 
amounts are put into perspective from a Turkish as well as 
an EU point of view. 
For Turkey, a net transfer of € 1.7 billion from the CAP 
would be about 0.3% of projected total GDP in 2015 and 
thus relatively small. Total annual EU payments for imple-
menting the CAP in Turkey would amount to about 9% of 
projected agricultural production value in 2015 and about 
€ 750 per capita employed in agriculture. This would in-
crease to about 12% of agricultural production value and 
about € 1 660 per person employed in agriculture in 2025.
9 
So for the agricultural sector, transfers resulting from the 
CAP are substantial. On the other hand, applying the CAP 
in Turkey would go along with significant price reductions 
leading to an estimated loss in producer income of about 
€ 1  billion  (GRETHE, 2004a: 211), and probably also an 
abolition of transfers to agricultural producers under the 
current Turkish system of direct payments, which amounted 
to € 1.3 billion in 2003 (OECD, 2004). 
More important from the Turkish perspective than the re-
sulting net transfers, however, seems to be the degree to 
which the CAP fits Turkish needs for the development of 
the agricultural sector. Direct payments in the first pillar of 
the CAP simply shift money to agricultural producers, 
which for the most part ends up in the pockets of land   
owners, as long as payments are linked to area. Such trans-
fers may even inhibit the necessary process of improvement 
of Turkish agricultural structure. Transfers of EU funds to 
Turkey under the second pillar of the CAP may hold more 
interest for Turkey than high direct payments. This is be-
cause payments under the second pillar can be targeted at 
measures which are aimed at improving productivity in 
                                                           
9   Negative growth rates projected for employment in the agri-
cultural sector above are extrapolated to 2025. Projections for 
the production value of Turkish agriculture are based on 
TURKISM. 
Turkish agriculture. Such measures might include training 
farmers in order to increase their productivity in agriculture 
or to enable them to leave the sector, public investment in 
rural infrastructure, modernization of the food processing 
industry, and measures to improve the distribution of land 
among farms (e.g. reparcelling). 
From an EU perspective, Turkey would be a significant 
recipient of CAP funds. Projections made above would 
estimate Turkey receiving about 5.7 to 10.2% of the CAP 
budget. This is not especially high compared to other large 
EU countries. For example in 2002 France received about 
€ 9.9 billion, which was 21% of the CAP budget of the EU-
15. In terms of the net transfer situation resulting from the 
CAP, Turkey is in line with other acceding countries: net 
transfers resulting from the CAP to the NMS-10 between 
2004 and 2006 are about € 900 million annually, and net 
transfers resulting from the CAP to Romania and Bulgaria 
are projected at € 1.7 billion annually for the period 2007 to 
2009.
10 Some of the EU-15 members also received large net 
transfers in the past: in 2002 net transfers to France result-
ing from the CAP were about € 1.5 billion and for Spain 
they amounted to € 2.9 billion.
11 
Finally, transfers to Turkey under the CAP can be assessed 
against the overall project of including Turkey in the EU, in 
budgetary as well as political terms. With respect to the 
budgetary impact of Turkish membership, expected trans-
fers resulting from the CAP are much below the transfers 
that would result from the full implementation of the cur-
rent EU structural policy in Turkey. Because of low income 
levels, all Turkish regions would be eligible to receive 
funds, and under the current policy rules the upper limit of 
payments after full phasing in would be 4% of GDP. As 
rural development measures are scheduled to be concen-
trated in the future in the European Agricultural Fund for 
Rural Development (EAFRD) which should be fully in-
cluded under the 4% limit (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2004e: 
28), the potential amount for structural policies (except 
rural development measures, which are partly included in 
this study under the CAP) is somewhat lower than 4%. 
Based on GDP projections made above, EU budgetary 
outlays for structural policy in Turkey could amount to 
€  14.6 billion in 2015. However, a slower phasing in is 
applied to the NMS-10, which receive about € 7.2 annually 
on average for 2004 to 2006 from the structural and cohe-
sion funds (EUROPEAN COMMISSION, 2002), equivalent to 
about 1.6% of their projected GDP in that period. For Bul-
garia and Romania an annual average sum of about 
€  2.8  billion is agreed upon for the period 2007-2009 
(EUROPEAN C OMMISSION, 2004f), which is about 3% of 
their projected GDP. For both country groups, structural 
and cohesion fund outlays per capita in the first three years 
of membership are around € 90, which seems to have been 
the navigational mark fixing the level of payments for this 
period. If one applies this level to the projected population 
in Turkey in 2015, Turkey would receive € 7.7 billion an-
                                                           
10  Own calculations based on the GDP growth rates presented 
above, the Financial Perspective for 2007-2013 (EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, 2004f), EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003b, 2004g), 
and AGRA (2004). 
11   Own calculations based on EUROPEAN C OMMISSION (2003c, 
2004b). Agrarwirtschaft 54 (2005), Heft 2 
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nually in the first years of membership which is used in this 
article as an indicator of the level of outlays for structural 
policies which may apply to Turkey in 2015. The question 
then remains, what the level of outlays for structural poli-
cies in Turkey may be in 2025. Table 4 shows that the stan-
dard approach of 4% of projected GDP would yield about 
€ 26 billion of outlays under the standard growth scenario. 
But for different reasons this figure should only be used as 
an indicator for the upper bound. First, some regions in 
Turkey may no longer be eligible for transfers under the EU 
structural policy due to economic convergence (current 
criterion is a regional GDP less than 75% of the EU aver-
age). Second, economic growth projections over a period of 
20 years are arguable. And third, the size of structural   
policy transfers under the 4% rule in case of accession of a 
country as large as Turkey may bring pressure to lower this 
upper limit. 
In order to assess the total size of potential outlays and net 
transfers under the accession of Turkey the category “other 
outlays” is included in table 4 to account for policies for 
fisheries, home affairs, justice etc., and the amount of € 1.6 
billion is adopted from OSKAM et al. (2004: 211). Table 4 
reports total EU budgetary outlays resulting from Turkish 
membership in 2015 between € 12.7 billion in the case of a 
phasing in of direct payments, and € 15.6 billion with full 
implementation of direct payments. Outlays may increase 
to more than € 30 billion in 2025 if current rules for struc-
tural policies are maintained. Total net transfers in 2015 
vary between € 6.5 billion with phased in direct payments 
and the catch-up growth scenario, and € 11.3 billion in case 
of full implementation of direct payments and the slow 
growth scenario. In 2025, total net transfers may be some-
where between € 19 and € 32 billion if current structural 
policies are maintained. It is interesting to note that the 
higher the growth assumption, the higher the projected net 
transfers to Turkey. Although Turkey pays a higher contri-
bution to the EU budget in the case of higher growth, this 
effect is overshadowed by higher outlays for payments 
under EU structural policies, for which the 4% of GDP 
limit is assumed to be binding. This, however, does not take 
into account that faster growth may lead to more Turkish 
regions exceeding the 75% of average EU GDP limit until 
2025, and would therefore no more be eligible for EU struc-
tural policies resulting in lower budgetary outlays. 
What becomes clear from table 4 is that the CAP is not the 
main budgetary factor determining the financial conse-
quences of Turkey gaining EU membership. Rather it is the 
future development of the EU structural policy and the 
results with respect to any phasing in period for this policy 
which will largely determine the level of total budgetary 
outlays and net transfers from the EU-27 to Turkey. In 
2015, only 20 to 25% of net transfers to Turkey would 
result from the CAP if direct payments are phased in. If 
direct payments are granted at full level in 2015, the share 
of net transfers resulting from the CAP would be about 
43%. In 2025, the share of the CAP in total net transfers 
may be as low as 6 to 19%. 
With respect to the overall political and economic project of 
including Turkey in the EU, costs resulting from the CAP 
take a background role. The values, interests and opportuni-
ties at stake seem too important to let an annual transfer of 
about € 1.7 to 4.5 billion dominate the discussion. Nonethe-
less, the accession of Turkey may be an additional incentive 
among many to fully decouple and phase out direct pay-
ments in the EU, which constitute the largest single agricul-
tural policy category in the above projections. Also, the fact 
that high transfers to land owners are not in the interest of 
future development of the Turkish agricultural sector may 
contribute to further reform of the EU’s direct payment 
system. 
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